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Aging in the Twenty-First Century*
Matilda White Riley, Senior Social Scientist,
National Institute on Aging
It would be no news, of course, if I observed that aging in the twenty-
first century will predictably be different from aging in the twentieth. In the
midst of all the other cataclysmic changes in this country and throughout
the world, I almost hesitate to address such a topic as changes in aging.
Yet the changes are daunting. I have no crystal ball to dust off as an aid
in considering them, but I do have some important observations to make.
Among other changes, the increase in human longevity and its enormous
implications for the aging process have to rank high. For the first time in
history people are aging in a society where most people live to be old. In
addition, while nearly three decades have been added to individual lives
during the twentieth century on the average, the entire world—and all our
familiar social structures and institutions—are changing around these lives.
These social changes affect people's lives in many dramatic ways, ways
that are still hard for us to comprehend because we are part of them.
All this is well known. What is news is that social and behavioral scien-
tists have begun to study these manifold changes and to anticipate and
debate the consequences for the future of the aging process and for its
potential. That is, scientific research is providing many clues not only to
* Abstracted by the Editors from: "Aging in the Twenty-First Century," the Boettner
Lecture, Boettner Research Institute, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 1990, now Boettner
Institute of Financial Gerontology, University of Pennsylvania. Reprinted by permission.
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what aging may be like in the future, but also what aging could be like if
the potential is fulfilled. These clues require a revision of traditional views
as to what aging means.
Structural Lag
In this lecture I am going to talk mainly about potentials. First, however,
I want to tell you about a new insight that points to these potentials. This
insight, recently forged from research, defines one of the most perplexing
problems of our time, the problem I call "structural lag." This concerns the
mismatch between the two central changes before us here: (1) changes in
individual aging and (2) changes in the structure of society that influence
the ways individuals age. While more and more people live longer than in
the past and grow old in new ways, social structures have been slow to
make room for them. These structures are still geared to the population of
much younger people that characterized the nineteenth—certainly not the
twenty-first century.
Health-care systems, for example, often fail to provide the supports nec-
essary for the many older people who, even when frail, now want to func-
tion independently. Unlike roles for school children or for young entrants
into the labor force, few roles have been developed to fit workers or stu-
dents who have grown old. Nor does society accord esteem and prestige to
the significant productivity of older people's unpaid roles as homemakers
or caretakers of the disabled. So I speak of the current mismatch as "struc-
tural lag" because the structure of social opportunities has not kept pace
with the rapid changes in the ways that people are now growing old.
Clearly this mismatch is fraught with contemporary problems. Yet
within it lie untold promising potentials for the future. My message here is
one of optimism. I shall argue that many of these potentials can become
realities—that the mismatch can be reduced by diverse kinds of interven-
tion. Intervention can occur through both public and private policies,
changes in professional practice, and individual choices in everyday life.
After all, the future does not just happen; it is created by human beings.
This is my vision: if the twentieth century has been the era of increasing
longevity, the twenty-first century will be the era of social opportunities for
older people to age in new and better ways.
To explain this prediction I am going to explore various kinds of inter-
vention (both deliberate and "naturally" occurring social changes). First I
shall discuss the potentials for aging—that is, how to optimize the already
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incredible strengths of people as they grow older. Second, and most critical
for the twenty-first century, I shall consider the potentials for our outdated
social structures—how to optimize the social opportunities for older people
(and thereby to reduce the problem of structural lag). Third I shall offer a
conceptual framework that social scientists use as an aid to the understand-
ing of individual aging, social opportunities, and the mismatch between
them. Of course such understanding is essential to a scientifically grounded
vision of aging in the future and to the changes needed for bringing this
vision into reality.
Optimizing Individual Aging
To begin with individual aging, let me call your attention to the unrec-
ognized strengths and capacities of most older people. 1 shall destroy the
myth that aging is exclusively a biological process. I shall ask you to think
along with me that people do not grow up and grow old in laboratories, but
rather in rapidly changing societies. And I shall report evidence for the
proposition that the aging process is not fixed; it is mutable and subject to
intervention and improvement.
The Fallacy of Inevitable Aging Decline
Much research has demonstrated that the doctrine of "inevitable aging
decline" is a fallacy—a fallacy initiated by faulty interpretation of cross-
sectional data. Nevertheless, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this
fallacious doctrine is still blindly accepted by many government policy-
makers, corporate executives, professional practitioners, and the public at
large. The stereotype of inevitable decline remains stubborn; the very
notion of aging seems to connote decrepitude, poverty, and misery
("afflicted with Alzheimer's disease," for example, or "imprisoned in a
nursing home" or "dependent on medicine" as the only means of prevent-
ing either disease or institutionalization). Doctors are found to spend less
time with older than younger patients. Old people themselves take their
aches and pains for granted, and assume, falsely, that they cannot learn
new skills or ways of thinking (such as use of computers or complicated
technologies).
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The "Real" Aging Process: Neither Fixed Nor Immutable
Yet those who listen to the evidence will realize that it is simply not true
that, because of age, all older people are destined to be ill, impoverished,
cut off from society, and sexually incapacitated, despondent, or unable to
reason or to remember. Of course, everyone dies. And some older people—
a minority—are seriously disadvantaged and in need of personal and soci-
etal support. But the vast majority function independently and effectively
(see Figure 1). The total number of people 65 and over will predictably
multiply in the twenty-first century, but the large number of the healthy
will heavily outweigh the number of disabled or institutionalized people.
FIGURE 1
Increasing Number of Older People
The research evidence demonstrates that the aging process is variable—
so that still greater strengths are possible. Social scientists are showing
how the aging process varies with social conditions: how individuals grow
old in widely diverse ways depending on their family life, their socioeco-
nomic status, and their work conditions. Social scientists are also showing
how the aging process changes over time as society changes. My grand-
mother at 75 was very different from what I was at 75, and my granddaugh-
ters will be still different when they reach 75—because we were born at
different times and grew older in different periods of history.
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Perhaps the most notable of all the historical alterations in the aging
process spring from the unprecedented increases in longevity—which allow
recent cohorts of young people to stay in school many years longer than
their predecessors did, prolong retirement, postpone many diseases of old
age, accumulate the experiences essential for wisdom, and extend family
relationships, so that husbands and wives now typically survive together
for four or even five decades or more. (For my husband and me 1991 was
our sixtieth year of marriage.) And it is these more recent cohorts who will
be the old people of the twenty-first century.
Potentials for Intervention
In short, the aging process is mutable, and most older people are able to
draw on widely diverse competencies—in health, intellect, and involve-
ment in affairs. In addition, (to reemphasize the point) there is significant
potential for enhancing these strengths still further. Just consider what this
means for the twenty-first century. Death is inevitable, but the nature of the
aging process is not inevitable—and after all, it is the quality of the later
years that counts.
What kinds of intervention, then, might sustain or even enhance this
quality in the future? Social and behavioral research has been producing
some spectacular findings:
• Among older workers intellectual functioning improves with age if
the work situation is challenging and calls for self-direction.
• Very old people whose performance on intelligence tests has deteri-
orated can be brought back to their performance levels of twenty
years earlier if the social environment affords incentives and oppor-
tunities for practicing and learning new strategies.
• Memory can be enhanced if the impoverished context that often
characterizes retirement is altered to include the stimulation of a
rich and complex environment.
• Even slowed reaction time, long attributed to irreversible aging
losses in central nervous system functioning, can be speeded up if
the social situation provides training and consistent feedback.
• Changing the social environment in nursing homes to increase the
sense of personal control and independence in aging patients can
result in greater social activity, changed immune functioning, and
perhaps even lowered mortality.
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Moreover, even when alterations in behavior, life-styles, and social contacts
are made late in life, such alterations can still reduce morbidity and mortality.
To stop cigarette smoking at age 60, for example, can make a difference.
Optimizing Social Opportunities
So much for the incredible strengths and potential capacities of older
people. Please note, however, that all these and many similar instances of
intervention in the ways people age are characterized by one common
theme: the older person's functioning is contingent upon the social condi-
tions. Bereft of social opportunities, resources, or incentives, older people
cannot utilize or sustain their mental or physical strengths and capacities,
and the "doctrine of inevitable aging decline" becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Thus the root of the mismatch lies not in people's capacities or
in the aging process itself, but in the lack of suitable social roles through
which individuals can move as they grow older. Consequently, aging in the
twenty-first century, will depend upon changes in society: on reduction of
the twentieth-century lag in social structures.
The Current Lag
Today's social structures and norms are the vestigial remains of the nine-
teenth-century, when most people died before their work was finished or
their last child had left home. Age 65 was established as the criterion for
insurance eligibility in Germany back in the late 1870s—yet age 65 is still
used in many countries under today's utterly changed conditions of
longevity. The older population is, of course, widely heterogeneous, but here
are some examples of typical misfits between aging and social structures:
• For many decades now opportunities for older workers have been
declining. Today less than half of men aged 55 and over are in the
labor force, a fraction that could drop to only one-third by the start
of the twenty-first century. For women, whose recent entry into the
paid labor force will have untold consequences, the lag is even more
pronounced. Yet survey after survey has indicated that large num-
bers of older workers wish to continue some kind of work if the
hours are flexible and the pay acceptable.
• In the family many older people are widows who live entirely alone.
Those who are frail often lack social supports to maintain independent
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living in their own homes. Health care facilities are inadequate and
costly, and people who are disabled often lack caretakers; many live
in fear of destitution.
• Older people's place in society generally has aptly been called a
"roleless role."
In sum, modifications in the role structure of society have indeed lagged
behind the rapid changes in the process of aging—changes in the strengths,
as well as in the numbers, of older people themselves. So far these struc-
tures have largely failed to aid older people in developing or expressing
their remarkable potentials.
Potentials for Intervention in the Twenty-First Century
Nevertheless, research on social structures is beginning to show that,
like the aging process, they too are mutable. Here again intervention to cor-
rect structural lag is found to be possible, and the possibilities in the
twenty-first century are predictably far-flung. Consider a few scattered
attempts at optimizing role structures for older people that are already
under way and that give clear evidence of what is possible in the future.
In education opportunities are being made for older people either to
teach (teaching adults who cannot read, for example, or immigrants who
can't speak English) or to go back to school. Nearly one thousand colleges
in the United States now accept students over age 65.
In leisure opportunities are being made both for recreation and for more
serious cultural pursuits. The Elderhostel movement is thriving worldwide, and
retirement communities are increasingly located close to university facilities.
In the household opportunities for frail older people to remain indepen-
dent are being improved through supportive community services, injury-
proof housing design, and elder-friendly tools older people can use.
Throughout the health-care system there are increasing demands for
older people in the role of care giver (rather than care receiver).
At work there is increasing provision of part-time work, job sharing, and
flexible hours. Some companies have model programs for "unretirement,"
that is, for rehiring retired employees. There are untold opportunities for
moonlighting in work that is not officially identified in official employ-
ment statistics. And there are increasingly varied and significant opportuni-
ties for many kinds of volunteer jobs.
All such structural interventions are producing new and more flexible
roles, and wider options, for older people. Whether or not particular older
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individuals wish to remain in the economic mainstream of society or to be
productive in the many unpaid and volunteer roles, one thing is clear: older
people do not wish now, nor will they wish in the next century, to be disre-
garded, denigrated, or dependent.
Implications for All Ages
There is also another noteworthy point here. As such structural interven-
tion develops in the next century, it will have implications for people of all
ages: young and middle-aged—not just the old. Making room in a college
classroom for older adults also affects the lives of traditional students who
are younger. Any structural intervention, even though aimed at the old, will
predictably have ramifications affecting how everyone grows older.
Indeed, I believe we can anticipate in practice in the twenty-first century
what we once regarded as a purely visionary potential, the breakdown of
the rigid age barriers that have traditionally divided societal roles into three
parts: education in youth, work in middle age, and leisure in old age. Those
"age-segregated" social structures may be giving way to more "age-inte-
grated" structures—providing options for people over their lifetimes to
intersperse periods of work with periods of education and leisure.
Furthermore, we can even begin to see signs of deliberate structural
intervention to support this interspersing—to make it possible for people to
move from school to work and later to go from work back again to school;
to change careers; and to spread leisure more evenly over the life course,
rather than concentrating nearly all of it in retirement. For example, some
organizations are providing educational leaves from work, more portable
pensions, or retraining for older adults and preparation for new occupa-
tions; others are allowing employees over their work lives to take several
years of leave, to be spent—according to choice—in family care, for travel,
or in continuing education.
Unintended Consequences
All these are heady portents of aging in the twenty-f i r s t century.
However, one critical question remains: how can we ensure that changes
and intervention undertaken today will optimize (rather than diminish)
older people's opportunities for the future? This question requires far-
reaching vision and the knowledge base essential for intervention, because
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intervention can sometimes have unintended and undesired consequences.
For example, encouraging everyone to engage in physical exercise, though
intended for lifelong strengthening of joints and muscles, may injure them
instead; tender loving care in nursing homes, though intended as emotional
support for older patients, may instead reduce independence and effective
functioning; and encouraging older people to work may result in abuse of
older workers.
Even elaboratively designed kinds of intervention can turn out to have
very little effect. For example, legislation to abolish age as a basis for
mandatory retirement has failed to slow the trend toward retiring early.
On the other hand, failure to intervene can exacerbate rather than reduce
structural lag. For example, suppose the traditional trends are simply
allowed to persist. A German scholar, Martin Kohli, has recently calculated
the absurd outcome: sometime in the second half of the twenty-first century
society could arrive at a point when people, at the age of about 38, will
move from the university directly into retirement! An absurd idea, to be
sure (but I am not being absurd when I predict the end of nearly universal
early retirement as we know it today).
The mission for social scientists, then, is to help guide intervention by
providing not only a broad vision, but also a firm scientific grounding for
this vision.
A Conceptual View of Intervention
Toward this end a conceptual framework from the sociology of age is
widely used for getting a handle on the future (as shown in Figure 2). It
represents social space bounded by ages on the vertical axis and by dates
on the horizontal axis. These dates indicate the course of history—past and
future. Within this space two sets of lines crisscross each other. These refer
to changes in aging and in social structures.
Aging
Consider first the diagonal lines, which refer to aging. They represent
successive cohorts of people who were born in particular time periods and
who are aging. As people age they move along the diagonal (see, for exam-
ple, Cohort A), across time and upward through the social structure; they
pass through the successive roles in family life, school grades and work
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AGE
FIGURE 2
Conceptual Framework: Aging and Social Change
careers, and retirement, and ultimately death. As they age they change bio-
logically, psychologically, and socially, and they develop their individual
strengths and capacities.
Moreover, because successive cohorts (the series of diagonals) are born
at different dates and live through different segments of historical time,
people in different cohorts age in different ways. Thus, a man born in 1890
(Cohort A) could scarcely have looked ahead to retirement at all, but a man
born in 1950 (Cohort C, now 40 years old) can expect to spend one-quarter
of his adult lifetime in retirement.
The diagonals in the figure are not purely abstract. They are used to aid
understanding of "growing old in the twenty-first century"—because facts
about the past lives of people now alive are already established. By tracing
their lives into the future, we can use these facts to forecast how they will
grow old.
Many facts are now available as guideposts to the future. In some ways
future cohorts of older people will predictably be better off than their pre-
decessors. For example, with improved nutrition, exercise, and reduced cig-
arette smoking in early life, they may well be less subject to heart disease
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when they reach later life. In other ways, however, the future cohorts of
older people may be less advantaged than their predecessors: their lives
will reflect the deteriorating economic conditions of today and the increas-
ing proportion of young people who are failing to meet acceptable standard
of academic achievement.
Two trends among women are especially provocative: an increasing pro-
portion of young women in each successive cohort has participated in the
labor force, and an increasing proportion has also experienced a divorce.
We sometimes think of these as negative indications for the future. But do
they perhaps mean instead that, as these young women become the older
women of the future, they will have acquired more skills than their prede-
cessors for living independently? Will their early work experience have
increased the future economic security of the many who will predictably
live alone in the next century?
Given this wide variety of early life experiences, one point about the
older people of the future seems certain: they will be widely heterogeneous.
Their needs for structural opportunities will be increasingly varied, and dif-
ferent types of people will call for different types of intervention.
Structural Change
In short, precisely what these older people will be like, how they will
grow old, and what their needs will be will depend in part on their past
lives. But in large part, they will also depend on the changing structure of
our society. The perpendicular line in the figure schematize this structure
and its changes. Consider a past year, such as 1980. Here the vertical line is
a cross-section slice through all the diagonal lines. This slice denotes the
age structure at a single moment in history. It indicates how both the peo-
ple and their social roles are organized roughly in age groupings, from the
youngest at the bottom to the oldest at the top. Along this slice, one can
imagine how people of all ages coexist and interact in the same society. In
a family, for example, members of four different generations interrelate,
either by forming close ties or by engaging in conflict. Or, in another
example, a nation's wealth can be distributed equitably between old and
young, or—as some contend is already happening—so inequitably as to
favor old people at the expense of children.
Over time, as society moves through past and future historical events
and changes, one can imagine this vertical line moving—across the space
from one date to the next. Over time, the age-related structures of opportu-
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nities are subject to social and cultural changes. And over time, the people
in particular age strata are no longer the same people; inevitably they are
continually being replaced by younger entrants from more recent cohorts
with more recent life experiences.
It is from these changes that the phenomenon of structural lag has been
emerging. Today older people have become more numerous, better edu-
cated, and more vigorous than their predecessors back in 1940 or 1970; but
so far few structural changes in society have been made for them. They are
still generally treated as a disadvantaged minority; that is, they are handi-
capped by the lag. It is here that intervention will be especially crucial for
the twenty-first century.
Asynchrony
One last—and I think intriguing—feature of Figure 2 is the inherent
paradox of timing. Aging individuals are moving along the axis of the life
course, the diagonal lines. But change in the structures of society (the mov-
ing vertical line) moves along its own axis of historical time. These two
sets of lines are continually crisscrossing each other. Hence, they can never
be perfectly synchronized. And it is this asynchrony that accounts for the
recurring mismatch between them—a mismatch that creates continuing
pressures for intervention.
To return now to the critical question with which I began: How can the
current lag be adjusted? How will structures change (or be changed) to fos-
ter the growing numbers, strengths, and heterogeneity of older people in
the twenty-first century? The details are still dim; but our conceptual dia-
gram opens up glimpses into the future.
My view of the future can now be quickly summarized. We can discern
a vision of a future society in which older people's lives are more varied,
more open to choice, more rewarding. We can glimpse aging in a possible
future society where lifelong learning will replace the lockstep of tradi-
tional education; a society where ageist discrimination will no longer be a
dominate force; a society where entirely new arrangements for financial
security will characterize the life course; a society where retirement as we
know it today will disappear and will be replaced by periods of leisure
interspersed throughout life with periods of education and work; a society
where the values of kinship and intimacy are matters of choice, not duty.
At this point, the vision fades, to be replaced by reality that these kinds
of intervention have yet be invented. I can, however, conclude with one
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sure prediction, theoretically grounded and empirically demonstrable: capa-
ble older people and empty role structures cannot long coexist. Aging in
the twenty-first century, in which the tension between the two must be con-
tinuously adjusted, will bear little resemblance to aging as we have known
it in the twentieth century.
